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EDWARD H. LEVI
LAW IN A SCIENTIFIC AGE. By Edwin W. Patterson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963. Pp. 87. $3.50.
In three lectures given at the Law School of Columbia University, Professor
Patterson explores three kinds of influence of science upon law: science has
brought about societal changes which in turn have presented new problems for
law to solve; scientific knowledge and devices have a bearing on the determination of factual issues in legal proceedings; and science represents a way of thought
and possibly a measure of success suggestive for or critical of legal reasoning,
systems, and institutions. Two of the essays elaborate the latter point; namely,
the "ideal" influences of science upon law. Scientific method suggests for law
the, importance of "neutral, impersonal, reliable, evaluative determinations"
- the "by-truth-possessed inquirer"; the importance of controlled experiments
or statistical generalizations; the utility of laws and theories which make possible the logical structural frameworks necessary for further criticism and
investigation.
Patterson classifies the uses of factual research of legal empiricism. Thus
there are inquiries into the goals of law, such as Bentham's, Pound's, McDougal
and Lasswell's, and Fuller's, where an appraisal of means, Patterson suggests,
is required to give substance to the goals. The goals may be long range or intermediate. The inquiry may be as to the multiple purposes of a law, such as the
Statute of Frauds; or as to the effect of means, which may be destructive of
desirable objectives, as was the case with the national prohibition law. The
inquiry may be as to the evaluative facts which will help create or explain those
legal rules which will make law more orderly and understandable. Controlled
experiments or statistical generalizations perhaps may be used to determine the
effectiveness of such matters as capital punishment. And empirical statistical
inquiries may be used to determine the results of legal procedure as was done
by the Gluecks on the treatment of offenders and the prediction of juvenile
delinquency, by the Chicago Jury Project to determine the effect of evidence
and- instructions, and by the Columbia Law School Project for Effective Justice
on certain aspects of personal injury litigation and on devices that would lessen
trial delays.
• As must be apparent, the scope of the material covered in these three
lectures is broad. The material is handled with an appealing skepticism and
receptivity. The difficulties of controlled experiments are recognized. The
meager fulfillment of the once cherished hope that the social sciences would
provide scientific conclusions directly pertinent to legal evaluations is readily
admitted. The difficulty of evaluating procedures or laws in controversial areas
where "a little evidence and a big emotion are often decisive either way" (p. 65)
is set forth- clearly. There is an awareness of the high cost of organized scientific research and due recognition for the unscientific wisdom of judges and

the unpretentious yet useful empirical investigations of law professors and students accomplished without the paraphernalia of elaborate designs. On balance
the volume represents gracious encouragement for relevant empirical studies
with an. emphasis on the need for objective factual determinations.

sense the thrust of the volume is to be found in the following sentences:
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The strict ethical standards that surround the judge and the deep
sense of responsibility that judges in our society feel are the best guarantees of ethical neutralism is the making of judicial evaluations that we
have as yet found. I believe that judges in their official conduct are
more unbiased than are scientists in their political pronouncements, but
still not as neutral as natural scientists in their laboratories. The standards of the latter deserve to be emulated by legal-empirical scientists
who will seek to find the factual bases of legal determinations. (pp. 36-37)
Patterson has not overlooked the role of public dialectic as the forum in
which "the distinction between statements of fact and statements of value serves
to locate the points about which further factual inquiries may be made, and
may lead to a reconciliation of competing evaluations." (pp. 33-34) Apparently his conclusion is that at least in actual practice the dialectic has not been
an effective substitute for the "by-truth-possessed inquirer."
Most of Patterson's first lecture is devoted to a discussion of the material
influences upon law of science and the products of its technology. Passing reference is made to the problem of controlling the use of the atom bomb, although
the example is used as a way of indicating how much more complicated the
control of men is than the control of particles of matter. Motor vehicles, drugs,
the dwindling -supply of fresh water, and the artificial seeding of the clouds are
mentioned as items or conditions where legal problems have some relationship
to technological changes or possibilities. To illustrate the problems using scientific knowledge in the legal process reference is made (1) to a Virginia
statute requiring the destruction of red cedar trees determined to be hosts of
cedar rust dangerous to apple crops; (2) to the right of a child to maintain an
action for prenatal injury possibly caused by deep x-ray therapy to the mother;
(3) to state statutes authorizing the sterilizing of mental defectives. The cedar
rust statute is used to illustrate the utility of permitting administrative discretion
to reactivate a statute presently unnecessary rather than repealing the statute no
longer required unless cedar rust develops a strain immune to all known fungicides. The prenatal injury case illustrates the necessity for the legal order to be
revised in the face of new facts, the point that proof of scientific "conclusions in
court seems to be unduly cumbersome" (pp. 17-18), and the view that "the
direct proof of scientific publication by qualified experts would be preferable to
the 'chancy' procedure of judicial notice." (p. 18) The statutes authorizing
sterilization are used to show that the Supreme Court was ill informed in the
case of Buck v. Bell, and the larger error of the optimistic assumption that these
laws would in a few generations eliminate mental defectives. Nevertheless Patterson concludes that these laws should not be repealed, for "the world needs
desperately to upgrade the mental ability of its population, and every bit helps."
(p. 22) Further it is said that the effects upon inmates who have been sterilized
is beneficial, and even if the offspring were normal, it would be reared by "at
least one socially inadequate parent." (p. 22)
Patterson's lectures are replete with examples of the kind of subjects upon
which law scientists give judgments or have views. There is a brief discussion of
the "logical-metaphysical separation of fact and value." This discussion is a
kind of reference to disputes about the content of systems of jurisprudence or
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the appropriate mechanism or authority for changes in the law well known
to the readers of the FORUM. Goal-directed legal philosophies are also mentioned with the comment that
such terms as "the public good," "freedom" are primarily rhetorical;
they have emotive effects upon the participants of a legal order, to the
extent that its society is a true community. They may have more specific
meaning in the context of special theories of law, as in Aristotle's
division of justice into rectificatory and distributive. Yet the notion
that these vague terms, without such a context, will serve to harmonize
and unify antagonistic groups of people has been shown more than
once to be fatuous. (p. 51)
There are views on biological and sociological matters, as for example on the
efficacy of sterilization. These views may be relevant to constitutional or legislative discussions. The appropriateness of administrative discretion for the
enforcement or nonenforcement of a statute are of a somewhat different order
since they relate more directly to the operations of the legal system. Conclusions as to the most appropriate way to bring before a tribunal the views of
experts on ' radiation in the prenatal injury case are of this order also, although
dealing with a different aspect of procedure. The propriety of changing legal
concepts to permit a child to maintain an action for prenatal injuries deals in
part with the arrangement and content of legal concepts, but as applied in the
radiation type of case involves all kinds of considerations as to which law as
a subject seems to have little to say.
Implicit in the lectures, then, is a disturbing question as to what law as a
discipline is all about. The legal order, since it is made for men in society, of
course must take account of the conditions of living which change, but this
does not make law the discipline which from itself provides the knowledge for
value judgments on all the events of living. Nor does it make law the normative or descriptive discipline of all the goals and all the mechanisms for the
good society. Patterson, paraphrasing Mr. Justice Frankfurter, states that
sociologists "may well be on tap, but not on top." (p. 56) Yet the range of
goal-directed philosophies for law is from those which seek to describe the good
society in full measure to those which seek to explain the special value of
legal process. The psychological and political efficacy of vague terms is directly
relevant-to the special values of the legal process. But even here if facts and
theories are to be found to challenge the conclusions derived at through undoubted on the job training in this realm, more than jurisprudence seems
involved. This is only to suggest that along with empirical studies more work
may'be required if not as to what is properly law then at least as to the appropriate range of relevant disciplines for a variety of problems.
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